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The WTO Agricultural Negotiations: 
Progress and Prospects
By Tim Josling
In the wee hours of August 1, 2004, the assembled trade
negotiators in Geneva agreed to a framework for the con-
tinuation of the Doha Round of trade negotiations, the
first under the auspices of the World Trade Organization
(WTO).1 Although it is somewhat behind the schedule
envisaged when the talks were launched in November
2001, the agreement has at least kept the Doha Round
alive and at best renewed hopes of a successful outcome.
A key part of the Framework Agreement was an accord
on the way forward for the agricultural talks.2 The agricul-
tural component of the Doha Round has been a long time
in the making. Talks started five years ago, in March 2000,
as mandated by the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agri-
culture. Completing the negotiations has proved difficult.
The world of agricultural trade negotiations is significantly
more complex now that in the late 1980s, when the Uru-
guay Round was at a similar stage. Many more countries
are taking an active part in the talks, both adding to the
constraints and contributing new demands. Moreover, the
impact of the stronger legal provisions of the WTO, rela-
tive to its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), adds additional burdens on those
negotiating new rules and reduction schedules for agricul-
tural trade. This article discusses the main issues that are
under negotiation in the agricultural talks and the pros-
pects for success.
Although the framework, discussed below, was a neces-
sary step in the agricultural talks, it did not signal the start
of the final phase of the negotiations. The next step is to
move to an agreement on how, by how much, and when
cuts in tariffs and subsidies should be made (known as the
modalities).3 The essential disagreements among countries
still remain, but they have been channeled into decisions
on specific parameters, such as the depth of tariff cuts and
reductions in domestic support. Importantly, this has
ruled out discussion of many issues that were not included
in the framework.
The main question now before the negotiators is how
to move from the Framework Agreement to a modalities
document in time for ministers to give their approval to it
at the next ministerial meeting in Hong Kong in Decem-
ber 2005. Should that (optimistic but still possible) time-
table hold, the year 2006 would be taken up by countries
translating the agreed modalities into draft schedules of
tariff cuts and subsidy reductions. A final end to the Doha
Round could come in early 2007, making the process just
a few months shorter than the previous round.
Several aspects of this round make it rather different
from the Uruguay Round that ended a decade ago. First,
the agricultural and food sector has “gone global” in the
past decade. This has been fuelled by the explosive growth
in supermarkets in developing countries and by the steady
lengthening of supply chains in developed countries as
retailers compete on price, quality, and choice. Second,
input industries have continued to consolidate and cross
borders, as have processing and transportation sectors.
1. See WTO, Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by 
the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579. This 
document is sometimes called the July Framework, as it 
was largely negotiated in that month.
2. This agricultural framework is Annex A of the Framework 
Agreement.
3. The first attempt at a Modalities Draft was made by the 
then chairman of the Agricultural Committee Stuart Har-
binson in February 2003. The document was ahead of its 
time, as countries were not ready to commit to the level of 
detail that it contained. Instead, the decision was taken to 
start with the framework to be agreed by the Cancun 
Ministerial. The July Framework essentially completes the 
work of the Cancun Ministerial.132 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2)
This has given rise to concerns about
competition and the role of farmers
in contract-driven agriculture. Third,
much more agricultural trade is now
in high-value-added goods, with the
market for undifferentiated com-
modities relatively static (though still
important). Profit margins in value-
added products have continued to
lure producers and processors. As a
result of these trends, the aspects of
the agricultural trade system that
have dominated the debate for sev-
eral decades—protective tariffs on
temperate-zone foodstuffs and gener-
ous subsidies to producers where
market prices were deemed inade-
quate—must now share attention
with overly restrictive health and
safety regulations and obtrusive intel-
lectual property protection.
The country dynamics in the
agricultural trade talks have changed
along with the issues. The GATT was
essentially dominated by developed
countries: Many developing coun-
tries belonged to the GATT, but
numerous opt-out provisions meant
that their impact on the negotiating
decisions was minimal. In the Uru-
guay Round, the negotiations could
in effect only be concluded when the
EU and the United States reached
agreement among themselves (as they
did at Blair House in November
1992). A similar attempt to develop a
joint position in August 2003, just
before the Cancun Ministerial, met a
very different fate, as Brazil, India,
China, and seventeen other countries
objected strongly to the US-EU pro-
posal and tabled their own plan for
curbing subsidies and cutting tariffs.
The G-20, as the group is known,
has essentially taken the lead in the
agricultural talks (particularly on
subsidies) since that time, and the
Framework Agreement gives them
the possibility (if they can maintain
their cohesion and credibility as a
negotiating force) of achieving much
of what they have sought.
So what is on the table in
Geneva? The main features of the
Framework Agreement for agricul-
ture are given in Table 1. Negotia-
tions have focused on the three pillars
of the Uruguay Round Agreement on
Agriculture, market access (tariffs
and tariff quotas, along with safe-
guards), export competition (export
subsidies and similar measures), and
domestic support (farm subsidies
paid or prices supported inside the
border).
Improving market access is politi-
cally essential for an agreement, as is
appropriate for trade talks aimed at
opening up markets in developed and
developing countries. Eliminating
export subsidies is a cherished aim of
several exporters and has been
endorsed by all countries including
those that would have to make signif-
icant adjustments.4 Curbing domes-
tic support is somewhat less essential
in improving trade opportunities but
has taken on a symbolic significance
beyond its commercial impact. Com-
peting exporters consider that US
farm programs enable farmers to sell
below production costs; developing
country governments claim that such
subsidies deny their farmers of a
chance to make a living. Policies in
the developed countries are in any
case moving in the direction of being
less trade-distorting, as a by-product
of improving the targeting of farm
payments at home, but they will be
anxious to gain some concessions
from developing countries at the bar-
gaining table for such changes.
The Framework Agreement spec-
ifies that conditions of market access
be improved by means of significant
tariff cuts, using a tiered formula that
imposes higher percentage cuts on
items with higher levels of current
tariffs. This attempt at harmoniza-
tion, if applied consistently and with
substantial cuts, would also create
new trade opportunities. It could also
significantly reduce the tariff “over-
hang” (between applied and bound
tariffs) and the “water” in the tariff
(the extent to which a tariff can be
reduced before imports are competi-
tive). However, the Framework
Agreement would allow all countries
to shelter some farm commodities
(designated as sensitive products) from
sharp cuts in tariffs, with the option
of increasing tariff-rate quotas
(TRQs) in these products to have an
equivalent effect on improving mar-
ket access.5 If the TRQs are not
expanded enough, much of the bene-
fit of the tariff cuts could be lost. The
agreement does, however, allow for a
tariff cap to be imposed; this could
apply some constraints to the contin-
ued protection of sensitive products.6
For many countries, opening up
markets brings concerns about
import surges and other disruptions
of the domestic market. The Uru-
guay Round Agreement included a
special agricultural safeguard (SSG), a
mechanism that allowed for tempo-
rary tariff increases in response to
price drops or import surges for some
products, mainly in developed coun-
tries.7 The fate of the SSG is still
4. The EU is by far the greatest user of 
direct export subsidies, whereas the 
United States has programs in 
export credit and food aid that con-
tain potential subsidy elements; 
Canada sells wheat abroad through 
a state trading agency that also is 
deemed to distort competition. 
Elimination of the subsidy element 
of these programs would have a rel-
atively small impact on trade but 
remove a glaring exception to WTO 
rules and a continued irritant to 
trade relations.2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2) CHOICES 133
Table 1. Summary of the main agricultural provisions of the WTO Framework Agreement.
Market access
Tariff cuts •Substantial improvement in market access through tariff reductions from bound rates.
•Single approach for all countries: tiered formula to ensure progressivity. Types of reduction commitments within bands and number of 
bands to be negotiated.
•Role of a tariff cap to be evaluated.
•Designation of an “appropriate number” of sensitive products, which would be subject to a mix of tariff cuts and TRQ expansion.
Tariff rate quotas •Reduce in-quota tariffs and improve administration (as part of balance of concessions).
•Some TRQ expansion for all sensitive products.
Safeguards •Future of special agricultural safeguard (SSG) under negotiation.
•Establish new special safeguard mechanism (SSM) for developing countries.
Special and differential 
treatment for developing 
countries
•Proportionately less tariff reductions for developing countries, with longer implementation period.
•Developing countries may designate special products on criteria of “food and livelihood security,” which would be subject to more 
flexible treatment.
•Fullest possible liberalization of trade in tropical products and alternatives to illicit narcotic crops by developed countries.
Other •Tariff escalation reduced by formula to be agreed upon.
•Erosion of preferences to be addressed using Harbinson Para 16 as reference.
Export competition
Export subsidies •Eliminate export subsidies by a credible end date.
•Schedule and modalities of reductions to be agreed.
Export credits •Eliminate export credits, guarantees, and insurance programs with repayment period of more than 180 days.
Food aid •Eliminate food aid that is not in conformity with disciplines to be agreed. Disciplines will be aimed at preventing commercial 
displacement.
•Other food aid issues (role of international organizations, humanitarian and development issues, and provision of aid in grant form) will 
be discussed in negotiations.
State trading enterprises •Eliminate trade-distorting practices of state trading enterprises.
•Further negotiation on issue of use of monopoly powers.
Special and differential 
treatment for developing 
countries
•Longer implementation periods for reductions and elimination.
•Developing countries to continue to benefit from Article 9.4 exceptions.
•Appropriate provisions for export credits in line with Decision on Least Developed and Net Food-Importing Countries.
•Developing countries to receive special consideration in negotiation of disciplines on STEs.
•Ad hoc temporary financing arrangements relating to exports to developing countries may be agreed in exceptional circumstances.




•Move to harmonize trade-distorting support (TDS) in developed countries (total AMS plus de minimis plus Blue Box levels) by use of 
tiered formula: greater efforts to reduce support by countries with higher TDS payments.
•Reduce overall trade-distorting support substantially: downpayment (20%) in first year.
Amber Box •Reduce total aggregate measures of support (AMS) substantially by use of tiered formula: greater efforts to reduce support by countries 
with higher Amber Box payments.
•Cap product-specific AMS levels at historical averages.
•Reductions in total AMS should lead to product-specific reductions.
Blue Box •Redefine to include payments with production limiting requirement and those with no production required: include payments based on 
fixed areas and yields and headage as well as payments based on less than 85% of base production.
•Cap payments to 5% of agricultural production from start of implementation period.
Green Box •Review Green Box criteria and improve surveillance and monitoring.
De minimis level •Negotiate the reduction of the level of de minimis support.
Special and differential 
treatment for developing 
countries
•Developing countries have longer implementation periods.
•Developing countries have lower reduction coefficients and higher de minimis levels.
•Developing countries retain the use of Article 6.2, allowing extra scope for domestic program.
Note. Data from author’s compilation based on WTO, Doha Work Programme: Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004, WT/L/579 (2004).134 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2)
under negotiation. The Framework
Agreement does, however, call for the
introduction of a special safeguard
mechanism (SSM) for developing
countries, with the aim of giving
these countries some contingent pro-
tection and encourage them to lower
tariffs. 
On export subsidies, the Frame-
work Agreement is more clearly
defined. The Framework Agreement
calls for the negotiation of a credible
date for eliminating export subsidies
and similar export aids, though that
date may be several years away. A key
provision is that there is parallel treat-
ment for the export subsidy compo-
nent of export credits (long time
periods and below-market interest
rates) and of state trading exporters
(low-interest loans and government
underwriting of losses). Food aid is to
be disciplined to avoid disruption of
commercial trade flows. Export taxes
and restrictions are also to be subject
to tighter rules. If an ambitious but
feasible date can be set for the
removal of export subsidies, the trade
system for agricultural products will
at last come into line with that for
manufactured goods, where export
aids have been banned for 40 years.
Negotiations on domestic sup-
port touch closest to home, as they
circumscribe the ability of domestic
legislatures to use particular farm
policy instruments. Domestic sup-
port (i.e., that not given at the bor-
der, through tariffs or export
assistance) is classified under the
WTO Agreement on Agriculture as
falling into three “boxes.” Amber Box
policies are those deemed to be the
most trade-distorting and include
deficiency payments and other pro-
ducer subsidies. Blue Box policies are
also potentially trade-distorting, but
as they include supply restrictions,
they are considered less likely to
harm other countries. Green Box pay-
ments are those subsidies that are not
related to current price or output and
are therefore considered minimally
trade-distorting.8 In addition to the
boxes, subsidies up to a fixed propor-
tion of the value of production (5%)
can be given in product-specific sup-
port, and another similar proportion
can be given in non-product-specific
support (de minimis payments).
The Framework Agreement calls
for a harmonization of levels of trade-
distorting domestic support (TDS)
and substantial cuts in the individual
components of this TDS—the total
aggregate measure of support (AMS)
or Amber Box payments, the Blue
Box, and the de minimis levels. The
TDS would be reduced progressively,
with higher levels coming down by a
greater percentage. A downpayment
of a 20% cut in the first year would
be followed by annual cuts. The Blue
Box criteria would be modified to
include payments on fixed acres and
yields but not linked to production
cuts, and the total Blue Box would be
limited to 5% of the value of produc-
tion. Green Box definitions would
not change, and there would be no
restrictions on this (minimally trade-
distorting) support. However, tighter
scrutiny (along with the implementa-
tion of the outcome of the cotton
panel) could yet cause some adjust-
ments in Green Box policies.
Impacts on individual developed
countries would vary, with significant
policy changes needed in the opera-
tion of both US and EU farm pro-
grams and some modification to
Japanese programs.9 The change in
the Blue Box definition would
accommodate countercyclical pay-
ments under current US programs,
and the downpayment would be fea-
sible without too immediate reduc-
tions. Significant AMS cuts would
limit payments under some other
programs, as the United States is
approaching its current AMS ceiling
($19.1 billion). The EU has recently
moved many of its payments into
line with Green Box criteria, and so
would be able to live with steep cuts
5. Tariff-rate quotas (reduced tariffs 
for specified quantities of imports) 
were introduced in the Uruguay 
Round as a way of ensuring some 
degree of market access for products 
formerly subject to nontariff import 
barriers (quotas and licenses, as 
well as minimum import prices). 
Many of these products will also be 
on the lists of sensitive products in 
the current round. The Framework 
Agreement mentions the reduction 
of in-quota tariffs as part of the 
achievement of a balanced result, 
but it confines the expansion of 
TRQs to the sensitive products.
6. Developing countries successfully 
pushed for the creation of a category 
of “special products” that would be 
subject to lower levels of tariff cuts.
7. The SSG has been available only 
for products where protection was 
converted from nontariff to tariff 
barriers in the Uruguay Round; 
this took place predominantly in 
developed countries.
8. Green Box payments include direct 
payments based on historical yields 
and acreage, or animal numbers, as 
well as the provision of public goods 
such as research and extension. 
9. The United States, Japan, and the 
EU account for most of the domestic 
support notified to the WTO. 
However, other developed countries, 
such as Norway and Switzerland, 
have an active interest in the extent 
of further constraints on domestic 
support.2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2) CHOICES 135
in TDS and AMS. Japan has also
shown flexibility in modifying the
details of its domestic programs,
though with little impact so far on its
overall level of protection.
The players in the WTO game
include the EU and the United
States, of course, although the tradi-
tional conflict in agricultural matters
between the transatlantic partners is
muted. The Cairns Group of four-
teen small and medium-sized farm
exporters, led by Australia, which was
active in the Uruguay Round, has
played a minor role in the Doha talks
since the Cancún Ministerial. Even
the “Quad” (the United States, the
EU, Japan, and Canada), who for
years acted as an informal executive
for the GATT and WTO negotia-
tions, has lost some of its signifi-
cance. Of increased stature in the
talks is the G-20 (mentioned above),
who agree on the importance of elim-
inating export subsidies and curbing
developed country subsidies but have
somewhat divergent internal views
on opening up developing-country
markets.
Several other groups have
emerged. The G-90—countries with
special access into the EU market as
well as many of the LDCs—was
formed at about the time of the Can-
cún Ministerial. This group of coun-
tries is concerned that they will be
asked to watch their preferences
being eroded in the European market
but would be unlikely to reap com-
parable benefits in other areas. The
G-10—developed country importers
with high levels of protection—was
formed to counter what they saw as
an alliance of exporters (including
the EU) pushing for greater market
access and lower domestic support
than their own political system could
accept. Finally, the July package was
brokered by a “nongroup” compris-
ing the United States, the EU, Brazil,
India, and Australia, known as the
Five Interested Parties (FIPS), who
agreed on the need to keep the talks
going even if they disagreed on the
details.
So, if these groups stay together,
the dynamic of the talks will reflect
the tensions within and between
these groups. The G-20 is pressuring
the EU and United States to make
significant cuts in domestic support
but will have to concede significant
tariff cuts if a balanced outcome is to
be reached. The ability of countries
such as Brazil to persuade India to go
along with deep tariff cuts will be
crucial both for the deal with the
United States and the EU but also to
expand south-south trade—an objec-
tive of the Latin American negotia-
tors. The G-90 will be keen to limit
the cuts in tariffs in the EU and the
United States for products such as
sugar and bananas where their prefer-
ences are particularly significant,
although compensation schemes
could blunt some of this opposition.
Overuse of the special products
option by developing countries, par-
ticularly those with relatively com-
petitive agricultural sectors, would
weaken their bargaining power in
other areas of the talks. The G-10, of
reluctant but not poor importers, will
be under extreme pressure from
domestic constituencies to resist the
sharp cuts in tariffs implied by the
tiered formula. However, the poten-
tial use of the sensitive product cate-
gory could help them to accept
inevitability and open up their mar-
kets to competition.10 The G-10 will
also be keen to keep flexibility in
domestic support, as many of them
regard national farm programs as part
of the social and economic fabric of
rural life. The issue of whether the
sensitive products option is a minor
refinement to allow a balanced agree-
ment or a deal-breaking loophole
that undermines the impact of tariff
cuts in major commodities and mar-
kets will be only be resolved by hard
bargaining on the details.
Is there the political will for a
deal? To have any realistic chance of
agreeing on a modalities document at
Hong Kong, negotiators will have to
have a fairly complete draft of a
Modalities Agreement by late sum-
mer. Although this timetable may
seem somewhat optimistic for a
round that has yet to pick up any
political momentum, there are rea-
sons to think that many countries
may wish to settle soon rather than
delay further. The expiry of the US
2002 Farm Bill gives the best chance
for other countries to steer the course
of US policy back to the path set in
1996, when payments were essen-
tially decoupled from production and
current prices, and the government
relaxed its attempts to control supply
and handle surpluses. A farm bill
negotiated in the context of a stalled
round would not be so restrained.
The need for renewal of Trade Pro-
motion Authority will also add
urgency to the discussions.11 Across
the Atlantic, the necessity for further
10.For these countries, the main reason 
to reach an agreement is the benefits 
that they can get from the nonagri-
cultural aspects of the negotiations. 
The depth of cuts in farm tariffs are 
therefore linked with the agreement 
to cut tariffs in other sectors in the 
nonagricultural market access 
(NAMA) negotiations and that in 
services. Keeping this balance is a 
challenge for negotiators in the run-
up to the Hong Kong Ministerial.
11. Extension of TPA is needed in June 
2005, although this is considered 
more likely to be approved than the 
reauthorization needed after the 
expiry of TPA in 2007.136 CHOICES 2nd Quarter 2005 • 20(2)
reforms in the EU’s Common Agri-
cultural Policy will increase, as the
budgetary pressures from enlarge-
ment will intensify as Bulgaria,
Romania, and Croatia join around
2007 and as talks continue with Tur-
key. In addition, increased pressure
for policy modifications from WTO
dispute settlement decisions—partic-
ularly those related to cotton and
sugar—could be enough to energize
the trade talks in the next two years.
If changes are to be made to bring a
program into compliance with WTO
rules, why not get some credit for
those changes at the bargaining table?
Countries do have an alternative
option to agreeing to a deal on agri-
culture in the WTO. There has been
an increased tendency for countries
to negotiate regional trade agree-
ments, with most WTO members
now belonging to a regional group.
But such talks are not ideal venues
for removing trade impediments in
agriculture, and there is a tendency to
omit sensitive farm products in order
to reach an agreement. Domestic pol-
icy curbs are not easily included in
such talks, as that would give an
advantage to other competitors, and
export subsidies from third countries
could still disrupt markets even if
such subsidies are banned within the
free trade zone. Therefore, the option
for exporting developing countries,
in particular, looks less attractive.
Even importing developing coun-
tries may find that pressures to open
up markets are no less relentless in
regional agreements: They will have
to reduce their trade barriers to part-
ner countries that will often include
competitive supplies of the good in
question. So, although the regional
talks may receive a boost from a
stalled Doha Round, the outcome
may be less comprehensive and just
as difficult to achieve.
The Doha Round agricultural
talks are important in the long-run
development of agricultural trade.
The opportunity to build upon the
Uruguay Round rules for agriculture
and reduce tariffs sharply is not to be
passed up lightly. Unless the modali-
ties become watered down with large
loopholes for sensitive and special
products, the reductions in tariffs
should translate into real market
access opportunities. Significant cuts
in trade-distorting subsidies are in
the cards and will put relatively tight
constraints on farm policies. In addi-
tion, to have finally eliminated
export subsidies would of itself be a
welcome and long-overdue step in
improving the functioning of the
agricultural trade system.
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